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Estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council

Thematic cluster I: special and personal envoys and special advisers of the Secretary-General

Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen

Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General for Conflict Prevention, including in Burundi

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report contains the proposed resource requirements for the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, and for the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General for Conflict Prevention, including in Burundi, for 2017, amounting to $27,414,400 net ($29,489,400 gross).

The General Assembly is requested to approve the 2017 budgets for these two Offices and to appropriate an additional amount of $28,385,700 (net of staff assessment) under section 3, Political affairs, after taking into account the estimated overexpenditure in 2016 amounting to $971,300, and an amount of $2,075,000 under section 36, Staff assessment, to be offset by a corresponding amount under income section 1, Income from staff assessment, of the programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017.

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I. Special political missions

A. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen

($15,487,300)

Background, mandate and objective

1. Since the beginning of the uprising in Yemen in early 2011, the Secretary-General has used his good offices to promote peace and stability through dialogue and negotiations. In its resolutions 2014 (2011), 2051 (2012), 2140 (2014), 2201 (2015), 2204 (2015) and 2216 (2015), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to continue and to intensify his good offices role. The Council receives regular briefings on Yemen in accordance with the current 60-day reporting cycle.

2. To ensure the full and effective implementation of Security Council resolutions 2014 (2011) and 2051 (2012), together with the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and its Implementation Mechanism, the Secretary-General established the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Yemen (see also S/2015/283 and S/2015/284) in accordance with an exchange of letters with the President of the Security Council in June 2012 (S/2012/469 and S/2012/470). As requested by the Yemeni parties, that Office supported the implementation of the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and its Implementation Mechanism through political mediation and facilitation efforts and by promoting the inclusive participation of all constituencies in the political transition.

3. Since the establishment of the Office of the Special Envoy in 2012, the United Nations has provided support for the Yemeni-led political transition process and has promoted inclusive participation, including of previously marginalized groups, such as youth movements, women's groups, the Hiraak Southern movement and the Houthi movement. With the support and facilitation provided by the United Nations, Yemenis concluded a National Dialogue Conference in January 2014, which brought together 565 delegates from all the regions and political groupings of Yemen. The outcome document of the National Dialogue Conference provided a blueprint for the creation of a new federal State underpinned by a commitment to democracy, good governance, the rule of law, national reconciliation and respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all the people of Yemen. A constitution drafting commission was created in order to draft a new constitution based on the outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference.

4. Despite important progress in the political transition, conflicts between government forces, the Houthis and other armed groups over the draft constitution and power-sharing arrangements led to an escalation of military violence in mid-2014. Agreements brokered by the former Special Adviser notwithstanding, the Houthis and allied units of the armed forces seized control of Sana'a and other parts of the country in September 2014 and over the ensuing months.

5. The United Nations facilitated numerous rounds of negotiations in an attempt to resolve the political impasse, but these efforts were insufficient to halt the escalation of military confrontations. In March 2015, Houthi-allied air force units bombed the presidential palace in Aden, where President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi had taken refuge after fleeing Sana'a. At the request of the President, a coalition of

countries led by Saudi Arabia intervened militarily on 26 March 2015 in order to secure the return of the Government. Ground fighting between Houthi and allied forces against Government of Yemen forces and allied militias intensified and spread, triggering a humanitarian emergency. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and other such terrorist groups have actively exploited the absence of security on the ground, extending their control over significant areas and conducting frequent attacks against government and civilian targets in many areas.

6. In its resolution 2216 (2015), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to intensify his good offices role in order to enable the resumption of a peaceful, inclusive, orderly and Yemeni-led transition. Since then, the Special Envoy has facilitated successive rounds of consultations aimed at obtaining a negotiated settlement to end the conflict and resume the political transition process, including direct talks in Switzerland in June and December 2015, and in Kuwait from April to August 2016.

7. Despite these efforts by the United Nations, fighting continues between various parties throughout the country, including along the border between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Concurrently, attacks claimed by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the Islamic State, as well as counter-insurgency operations against those groups, continue in southern Yemen where the overall security situation remains highly volatile.

8. To alleviate the humanitarian situation and create an environment conducive to the talks, a cessation of hostilities facilitated by the Special Envoy came into effect on 10 April 2016. In addition, the Special Envoy assisted the parties in establishing the De-escalation and Coordination Committee, a United Nations-supported body composed of military representatives from the parties directly involved in the military conflict. It aims to promote communication between the parties and to strengthen adherence to the cessation of hostilities. To complement the work of the Committee, local de-escalation committees were established in the six most conflict-affected governorates to provide additional support for the cessation of hostilities.

9. In the statement of 25 April 2016 by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2016/5), the Council called upon all Yemeni parties to develop a road map for the implementation of interim security measures, especially at the local level, withdrawals, the handover of heavy weapons, the restoration of State institutions and the resumption of political dialogue in line with relevant Security Council decisions, the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and its Implementation Mechanism, and the outcomes of the comprehensive National Dialogue Conference. The Council also requested the Secretary-General to present a plan outlining how the Office of the Special Envoy could support the next phase of its work with the parties, in particular to support the elements set out above.

10. The response of the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council dated 24 May 2016 (S/2016/488), of which the Council took note in its letter dated 26 May 2016 (S/2016/489), set out a proposal to strengthen the Office of the Special Envoy to provide expanded support to the Yemeni-Yemeni talks and to the implementation of the resultant agreements. The Office would undertake the following main functions:

(a) Lead United Nations assistance in the peace talks in the provision of facilitation and technical advice on the negotiation and design of: (i) interim security arrangements, including the formation of security committees, the negotiated withdrawal of militias and armed groups and the orderly handover of heavy weapons to the State; (ii) the restoration of State institutions, including respect for the legally established lines of authority and the removal of any obstructions to the proper functioning of State institutions; and (iii) preparations for the resumption of political dialogue, including agreements for finalizing and adopting the draft constitution, undertaking electoral reform and holding general elections;

(b) Lead United Nations assistance with regard to expanded facilitation and the provision of technical advice to the Yemeni parties with the aim of ensuring greater respect for and compliance with the cessation of hostilities, including through support for the De-escalation and Coordination Committee, local committees and additional local mechanisms;

(c) Lead United Nations assistance for the implementation of initial stages of agreements concluded through negotiations and to plan and prepare for United Nations support for the implementation of more comprehensive agreements.

11. The overall aim of the Office is to provide support to the Yemen peace process, the cessation of hostilities (through the de-escalation and coordination mechanisms) and the implementation of agreements resulting from the peace process so as to enable the resumption of a peaceful, inclusive, orderly and Yemeni-led transition.

Cooperation with other entities

12. The Department of Political Affairs of the Secretariat is responsible for providing substantive backstopping support to the Office of the Special Envoy.

13. The Department of Field Support of the Secretariat will continue to provide strategic guidance on field support issues relating to the Office in Yemen and in Amman. Advice on safety and security for the Office, as well as for other United Nations entities in Yemen, is regularly obtained from the Department of Safety and Security of the Secretariat. The Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia and other United Nations offices in the region provide support through the provision of close protection security officers to supplement the existing close protection team, on an ad hoc, cost-reimbursable basis, if a surge in these requirements occurs. The Kuwait Joint Support Office will continue to provide transactional support in the areas of finance, human resources and travel.

14. In fulfilling its tasks, the Office of the Special Envoy works closely with United Nations departments, agencies, funds and programmes, as well as the Resident Coordinator and the United Nations country team in Yemen. System-wide information-sharing and coordination at the working and senior levels is organized through meetings of the Inter-Agency Task Force on Yemen.

15. In implementing the Secretary-General's good offices role, the Special Envoy and his Office engage closely with Member States and the Security Council, as well as international and regional organizations, including the League of Arab States, the Gulf Cooperation Council and other international partners.

16. Work on the draft constitution, electoral reform and other transition tasks are to be conducted in close coordination with the Electoral Assistance Division in the Department of Political Affairs, the Resident Coordinator and the United Nations country team.

Performance information

17. The establishment of the mission in Yemen in mid-2012 enabled the launch of the transition process through political facilitation, monitoring and the provision of technical expertise.

18. An important achievement was the successful conclusion of the inclusive National Dialogue Conference in January 2014. It established the framework and principles for the creation of a new federal and democratic State and allowed for the launch of the constitution-making process. With the facilitation and mediation efforts of the Special Envoy, the Constitution Drafting Committee reached consensus on a first draft of the new constitution, submitted to the national body for oversight of the implementation of the National Dialogue Conference outcomes in January 2015, for review and approval in the future.

19. Subsequent steps necessary to finalize the draft constitution, including public consultations, the adoption of the constitution, the amendment of relevant electoral legislation and preparations for elections, remain pending. It is expected that extensive political debate and intensive mediation efforts by the Special Envoy would be required. Following the breakdown of the political transition and military escalation in early 2015, these activities are expected to commence as soon as an agreement to end the military confrontations is concluded.

20. Throughout the period since the escalation of the conflict, the Special Envoy has been engaged in efforts to promote a peaceful, negotiated settlement. Mediation activities to enable the resumption of a peaceful, inclusive, orderly and Yemeni-led political transition process that meets the legitimate demands and aspirations of the people have included bilateral and multilateral consultations with local, regional and international stakeholders as well as the facilitation of direct talks between the Yemeni parties (Geneva in June 2015; Biel, Switzerland, in December 2015; and Kuwait City from April to August 2016). The Special Envoy facilitated two agreements on the cessation of hostilities in December 2015 and April 2016 and the establishment of the De-escalation and Coordination Committee and local de-escalation committees for overseeing its implementation. During the Kuwait talks, he supported a working group on the release of prisoners and facilitated agreement among the warring parties on the formation of key bodies for the implementation of a peace agreement. Mediation efforts continue in order to finalize the details and sequencing of a comprehensive peace agreement.

Planning assumptions for 2017

21. Since the conclusion of the Kuwait talks, the Special Envoy has been engaged in extensive consultations with the Yemeni parties, the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the wider international community. Subsequently, he presented the Yemeni parties with a draft road map that addresses security and political arrangements consistent with the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and its Implementation Mechanism, the outcomes of the comprehensive National

Dialogue Conference and the relevant Security Council resolutions. The road map contains a set of sequenced political and security steps, to be implemented in parallel, which would help Yemen to return to an inclusive, peaceful and orderly Yemeni-led transition. Further consultations and negotiations would be required to build on the road map presented by the Special Envoy in order to reach a comprehensive negotiated settlement.

22. It is expected that the engagement of the Security Council will remain active and high, including regular reporting requirements to the Council (every 60 days). The reports are presented to the Council by the Special Envoy, and, given the expected challenges to the peace process, frequent ad hoc briefings by the Special Envoy can be anticipated.

23. The Office will continue to mediate between the Yemeni parties to the conflict in an effort to facilitate a negotiated settlement based on the road map. The parties are expected to continue to need substantial support in the negotiations with the design of mechanisms and processes that will form part of an agreement or series of agreements to end the conflict, including with regard to ceasefire monitoring, the withdrawal of forces and the handover of heavy weapons, the establishment of other interim security arrangements, the restoration of State institutions and the resumption of the political transition process (finalizing and adopting a draft constitution, undertaking electoral reform, holding general elections).

24. The Office will continue to support the parties in the De-escalation and Coordination Committee, and at the governorate level, the local de-escalation committees. They will continue to need substantial technical and facilitation support to ensure the effective functioning of the bodies in order for the committees to contribute to a de-escalation of fighting and the strengthening of the cessation of hostilities. While the Yemeni parties are expected to remain committed in principle to the cessation of hostilities, it is likely to be fragile and periodically strained by tensions in the talks and military confrontations. The De-escalation and Coordination Committee will be based in Dhahran Al-Janoub, Saudi Arabia.

25. The security conditions in Yemen are expected to remain very challenging for United Nations staff, such that the Office and most of its staff will be based outside of Yemen with periodic travel to Yemen, as and when required, and as security and operational conditions permit. In his letter dated 24 May 2016 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2016/488), the Secretary-General expressed his intention to move the Office of the Special Envoy from New York to Amman. From there it would serve as an initial hub for the provision of support to Yemeni parties and operations in Yemen. The presence of the Office in Sana'a would remain limited initially, but would increase over time as the security and operational conditions permit to enable more effective monitoring and reporting on the situation, as well as closer engagement with the Yemeni interlocutors, particularly in connection with the peace process, activities in support of the cessation of hostilities and the early implementation of agreements resulting from the peace talks.

26. Military operations against violent extremists will continue. Extremist groups will continue to present a hostile threat to United Nations personnel and other actors. The threat to the safety and security of staff will therefore be very high in areas where such risks exist, and the freedom of movement of staff outside of Sana'a will be greatly constrained. The implications of both the nature of the

evolving security concerns and the principle of local ownership will require that the Office will adopt an approach that supports the Yemeni parties mainly through the provision of technical advice and facilitation assistance on the negotiation and design of elements for eventual agreement or agreements, the functioning of de-escalation mechanisms and the implementation of the resulting agreements.

27. The expansion of the Office of the Special Envoy resulted from calls by the Security Council, in its presidential statement of 25 April 2016 (S/PRST/2016/5), for the Secretary-General to present a plan, within 30 days, to strengthen the Office to provide support to the Yemen peace process, the cessation of hostilities and the implementation of agreements resulting from the peace process so as to enable the resumption of a peaceful, inclusive, orderly and Yemeni-led transition. In his response (S/2016/488), the Secretary-General outlined a plan that included the necessary strengthening of capacity as well as the relocation of the Office's headquarters from New York to Amman. The Security Council responded on 26 May 2016 (see S/2016/489), acknowledging the plan.

28. Subsequent efforts to strengthen the Office of the Special Envoy have been staged in line with progress in the design and facilitation of the negotiations of peace agreements and efforts to reduce the levels of violence in Yemen. The Special Envoy and his team are currently leading intensive bilateral consultations with both parties to the conflict and with other stakeholders in the region and beyond. This includes negotiations on interim security measures and the extension of the United Nations-brokered cessation of hostilities, which came into effect on 19 October, so as to create a conducive environment for a long-lasting peace in the country.

29. To fulfil the new responsibilities and tasks endorsed by the Security Council, the Office of the Special Envoy will require additional staff with expertise in political mediation and facilitation, electoral affairs, ceasefire, disengagement, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and other security sector issues. The increase in these requirements would put a strain on the existing mission support staff and safety and security capacities that would require augmentation in order to support the good offices of the Secretary-General.

30. The Special Envoy will travel regularly to Yemen and to the region to maintain close contact with all stakeholders, including the President, the Prime Minister, the Government (based in Riyadh since March 2015), all political parties, the Houthis, the Southern Hiraak movement and other key stakeholders, including women's groups, the youth movement and civil society.

31. The need for the Special Envoy to engage frequently with regional actors will remain. Regular visits to the region are expected, including to the capitals of several countries, in support of international engagement and coordination.

32. The objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement, and performance measures of the Office are set out below.

Table 1
Objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures

Objective: Inclusive peace process in Yemen is advanced, while levels of violence are reduced

Expected accomplishments	*Indicators of achievement*		*Performance measures*		
			2017	*2016*	*2015*
(a) A negotiated solution is agreed that meets the legitimate will of the Yemeni people	(i) Agreement on the road map signed by both parties to the conflict	Target	Yes	Not applicable	Not applicable
		Estimate		No	Not applicable
		Actual			No
	(ii) Number of meetings of representatives of parties to the conflict in an inclusive and comprehensive process (bilateral meetings, facilitated talks)	Target	50	Not applicable	Not applicable
		Estimate		50	Not applicable
		Actual			10
	(iii) Number of instances of technical advice provided on the negotiation and design of elements for the road map or initial agreement (capacity-building, options papers)	Target	50	Not applicable	Not applicable
		Estimate		50	Not applicable
		Actual			10
	(iv) Number of cases in which women, youth and civil society organizations are meaningfully included in the political process (memberships in political bodies, capacity-building)	Target	80	Not applicable	Not applicable
		Estimate		30	Not applicable
		Actual			5

Outputs

- Regular engagement and consultations and provision of technical advice on the negotiation and design of interim security arrangements, including the formation of security committees, the negotiated withdrawal of militias and armed groups and the orderly handover of heavy weapons to the State (100)
- Consultations and provision of technical advice on the restoration of State institutions, including respect for the legally established lines of authority and the removal of any obstructions to the proper functioning of State institutions (40)
- Consultations and technical advice on the resumption of the political dialogue, including agreements for finalizing and adopting the draft constitution, undertaking electoral reform and holding general elections (60)

Expected accomplishments	*Indicators of achievement*		*Performance measures*		
			2017	*2016*	*2015*
(b) Strengthened cessation of hostilities	(i) Number of reported hostilities decreases	Target	Yes	Not applicable	Not applicable
		Estimate		Yes	Not applicable
		Actual			No
	(ii) Number of technical support initiatives provided to relevant security committees and local mechanisms (capacity-building, advisory products)	Target	100	Not applicable	Not applicable
		Estimate		100	Not applicable
		Actual			5

Outputs

- Assistance with regard to expanded facilitation and technical advice to the Yemeni parties with the aim of ensuring greater respect for and compliance with the cessation of hostilities, including through support for security committees and additional local mechanisms (50)

External factors

33. The objective is expected to be achieved provided that there is sufficient political will, support and engagement from the various stakeholders and there is continued support from the international community.

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 2
Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	1 January-31 December 2016				*Requirements for 1 January-31 December 2017*			
	Appropriation	*Estimated expenditure*	*Variance*	*Appropriation 2016*	*Total requirements*	*Non-recurrent requirements*	*Variance (2017-2016)*	*Net requirements for 2017[a]*
Category	*(1)*	*(2)*	*(3) (1)-(2)*	*(4) (1)*	*(5)*	*(6)*	*(7) (5)-(4)*	*(8) (5)-(3)*
Civilian personnel costs	3 804.8	4 480.4	(675.6)	3 804.8	8 912.9	–	5 108.1	9 588.5
Operational costs	2 925.3	3 436.0	(510.7)	2 925.3	6 574.4	1 382.0	3 649.1	7 085.1
Total	**6 730.1**	**7 916.4**	**(1 186.3)**	**6 730.1**	**15 487.3**	**1 382.0**	**8 757.2**	**16 673.6**

[a] Net requirements after taking into account the estimated underexpenditure or overexpenditure for 2016.

Table 3
Positions

	Professional and higher categories								*General Service and related categories*			*National staff*			
	USG	*ASG*	*D-2*	*D-1*	*P-5*	*P-4*	*P-3*	*P-2*	***Subtotal***	*Field Security Service*	*General Service*	***Total international***	*National Officer*	*Local level*	*United Nations Volunteers*	***Total***
Approved 2016	1	–	1	–	4	5	3	–	**14**	13	1	**28**	2	9	–	**39**
Proposed 2017	1	1	–	4	8	18	14	–	**46**	27	2	**75**	8	30	–	**113**
Change	–	**1**	**(1)**	**4**	**4**	**13**	**11**	–	**32**	**14**	**1**	**47**	**6**	**21**	–	**74**

34. The anticipated overexpenditure for 2016 is attributed mainly to additional requirements for international and national staff costs, as well as operational costs, to facilitate the implementation of Security Council resolution 2216 (2015), and of the recent consideration by the Council of the Secretary-General's proposal to strengthen the Office of the Special Envoy and to provide expanded support to the Yemeni-Yemeni peace talks and to the implementation of the resultant agreements. The additional expenditures are covered through a commitment authority concurred to by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions on 3 October 2016 in the amount of $1,186,300 under the terms of General Assembly resolution 70/250. Appropriation for the expenditures against the commitment authority will be sought in the context of the overall requirements for special political missions for the biennium 2016-2017.

35. The estimated requirements for the Office of the Special Envoy for 2017 amount to $15,487,300 (net of staff assessment) and will provide for civilian personnel ($8,912,900) comprising salaries and common staff costs for international staff ($8,168,800); national staff ($744,100); and operational costs ($6,574,400), including official travel ($1,059,800); facilities and infrastructure ($2,814,400); ground transportation ($1,194,700); air transportation ($192,800); communications ($260,700); information technology ($375,900); medical ($40,200); and other supplies, services and equipment ($635,900).

36. The total proposed staffing complement for the Office of the Special Envoy for 2017 includes a total of 113 positions, including 74 proposed new positions, with 49 positions based in Amman, 57 positions based in Sana'a, 2 positions based in Kuwait and 5 positions based in New York. In relation to the implementation of Security Council resolution 2216 (2015), and in the outline presented by the Secretary-General in his letter (S/2016/488), it is proposed that 74 new positions be established.

37. The Office of the Special Envoy proposes the following changes:

(a) Proposed new positions — 74 positions (47 international staff and 27 national staff):

Proposed establishment of 39 new substantive positions, including:

(i) Three D-1 (2 positions based in Amman and 1 position based in Sana'a);

(ii) Four P-5 (3 positions based in Amman and 1 position based in Sana'a);

(iii) Seven P-4 (5 positions based in Amman and 2 positions based in Sana'a);

(iv) Six P-3 (3 positions based in Amman and 3 positions based in Sana'a);

(v) Three Field Service, based in Amman;

(vi) Five National Professional Officer, based in Sana'a;

(vii) Eleven Local level (6 positions based in Amman and 5 positions based in Sana'a);

Proposed establishment of seven new security-related positions, including:

(i) Five positions (1 P-4, 1 P-3, 2 Field Service and 1 Local level), based in Sana'a;

(ii) Two positions (1 Field Service and 1 Local level), based in Amman;

Proposed establishment of 25 new mission support-related positions, including:

(i) One D-1, based in Amman;

(ii) Four P-4, based in Amman;

(iii) Three P-3 (2 positions based in Amman and 1 position based in Sana'a);

(iv) Eight Field Service (5 positions based in Amman and 3 positions based in Sana'a);

(v) One National Professional Officer, based in Amman;

(vi) Eight Local level (4 positions based in Amman, 2 positions based in Sana'a and 2 positions based in Kuwait);

Proposed establishment of three new backstopping-related positions, based in New York, including:

One P-4, one P-3 and one General Service (Other level);

(b) Proposed redeployment (locations) for the following positions:

(i) From New York to Amman: four substantive positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 P-5, 1 P-4 and 1 P-3);

(ii) From Sana'a to Amman: three substantive positions, including two positions (1 P-5 and 1 P-4) and one position to mission support (1 Field Service);

(c) Proposed reclassification and redeployment:

Proposed reclassification of one D-2 position to the level of Assistant Secretary-General and the redeployment of the same position from Sana'a to Amman;

(d) Proposed establishment of new substantive sections, including the Office of the Chief of Staff, the Office of the Deputy Head of Mission, the Security Sector Section and the Public Information Section, to meet the requirements of the Office of the Special Envoy.

38. The outline presented by the Secretary-General to the Security Council in his letter (S/2016/488) also indicated his intention of moving the Office of the Special Envoy for Yemen from New York to Amman. From Amman, the Office of the Special Envoy would serve as a staging ground to provide support to the Yemeni parties and operations in Yemen, with a forward presence in Sana'a. A presence in Sana'a would remain limited initially, but would increase over time as the security situation and operational conditions permit. The Secretary-General also indicated that the expanded Office of the Special Envoy would require staff with expertise in political mediation and facilitation, electoral affairs, ceasefire, disengagement, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and other security sector issues, and the accompanying administrative, security and support services. Two substantive support positions (1 P-4 and 1 General Service (Other level)) of the Office of Special Envoy will continue to remain in New York to support the Office by engaging with the Security Council, Member States and other stakeholders in New York.

Substantive positions

39. Under the substantive component, the establishment of 39 new positions (3 D-1, 4 P-5, 7 P-4, 6 P-3, 3 Field Service, 5 National Professional Officer and 11 Local level) is proposed, increasing the existing substantive staffing complement from the existing 16 positions approved for 2016 to 54 proposed positions in 2017, and an outward redeployment of 1 position (Field Service) from the Office of Political Support in Sana'a to the Office of the Chief of Mission Support in Amman. It is also proposed that following new sections be established: the Office of the Chief of Staff; the Office of the Deputy Head of Mission; the Security Sector Section; and the Public Information Section. Noting the challenges that the Office of the Special Envoy is expected to address in terms of its complex mandate and difficult political and operating environment, it is proposed that the position of Director of Political Affairs (D-2) be reclassified to the level of Assistant Secretary-

General, as the Deputy Head of Mission. It is also proposed that a position of Chief of Staff (D-1) be established to ensure cohesion and coordination in strategic planning and operations across the mission components. A position of Principal Security Sector Reform Officer (D-1) is proposed to head the Security Sector Section and a position of Principal Political Affairs Officer (D-1) is proposed to head the Political Affairs Section.

Security-related positions

40. Under the security-related staffing, the Office of the Special Envoy proposes the establishment of seven new positions (1 P-4, 1 P-3, 3 Field Service and 2 Local level), increasing the security-related staffing complement from 13 positions approved for 2016 to 20 positons in 2017. The proposed establishment of seven additional positions relate to (a) facilities protection, consisting primarily of vehicle and pedestrian searches at access control points; (b) the provision of close protection to the Head of Mission and other senior United Nations officials in Yemen; and (c) other activities to ensure the best safety and security for the personnel, operations and assets.

Mission support-related positions

41. Under the mission support component, the Office of the Special Envoy proposes the establishment of 25 new positions (1 D-1, 4 P-4, 3 P-3, 8 Field Service, 1 National Professional Officer and 8 Local level) and an inward redeployment of one position (1 Field Service) from the Office of Political Support in Sana'a to the Office of Chief Mission Support in Amman, increasing the mission support-related staffing complement from 10 positions approved for 2016 positions to 36 proposed positions in 2017.

42. It is proposed that one new position of Chief of Mission Support (D-1) be established to head the mission support component, reflecting the level of operational risk and complexity of the Office's operations, spread across multiple locations with challenging operating parameters. Furthermore, the civil strife and the breakdown of government institutions pose administrative and logistical challenges in scaling up operations in Yemen. Additional positions are proposed to be established in the areas of administration, human resources, procurement, finance, communications and information technology, movements and transport. These positions are required to support the Office of the Special Envoy in its operations and activities in Amman and Sana'a. The provision of a mission support component will be based on the principles of a light, flexible multifunctional footprint, integrated delivery of mission support with the United Nations country team inside Yemen and continued reliance on the Kuwait Joint Support Office to provide support for transactional human resources, travel and finance. In continuing the Office's small footprint for administrative services, two new Local level positions in finance and human resources are proposed to be established to continue transactional support by the Kuwait Joint Support Office. Core human resources and finance responsibilities are location-dependent and are proposed to be established within the mission support component of the Office of the Special Envoy. The positions proposed under communications and information technology took into account the remote delivery of services that can be provided by both the Middle East Regional Information and Communications Technology Services and the

United Nations Global Service Centre in Brindisi, Italy, and Valencia, Spain. The proposal also took into consideration all services that are location-dependent and require the presence of expert personnel in situ, such as on-site network administration, information and communications technology, security, videoconferencing services, user support, radio programming and interaction with local providers. The proposed staffing was made in order to address the minimum operational requirements necessary for the smooth conduct of operations, including establishing the operational resilience of the mission.

Backstopping-related positions

43. It is also proposed that three backstopping positions (1 P-4, 1 P-3 and 1 General Service (Other level)) be established in New York, including (a) two positions in the Department of Field Support (1 position of Human Resources Officer (P-4) and 1 position of Acquisition Planning and Logistics Officer (P-3)) to provide Headquarters-based guidance efforts for the Office of the Special Envoy in the areas of human resources and logistics; and (b) one position of Programme Budget Assistant (General Service (Other level)) in the Programme Planning and Budget Division of the Department of Management to ensure the provision of timely and adequate support in the review and preparation of budgetary documents and the monitoring of budget utilization by special political missions.

44. The variance (increase) between the proposed resources for 2017 and the approved budget for 2016 is attributable to (a) the proposed establishment of 74 positions (47 international staff and 27 national staff); (b) an increase under facilities and infrastructure, including for the rental of premises; alteration and renovation services, to meet the minimum operating safety standards and seismic-standard requirements; and the acquisition of prefabricated facilities, generators and water treatment equipment for the new office spaces; and (c) the acquisition of vehicles for the Office of the Special Envoy; offset in part by the decrease under air transportation, including requirements for special chartered flights and official travel costs, as the Special Envoy would be based in the region in 2017.

Extrabudgetary resources

45. In 2016, extrabudgetary resources estimated at $437,000 have been utilized to support the Office of the Special Envoy to assist in the strategic planning for the mission's added responsibilities and tasks. In 2017, necessary funding amounting to $666,000 has been secured to provide support to the De-escalation and Coordination Committee and the negotiations on security arrangements.

B. Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General for Conflict Prevention, including in Burundi

($11,927,100)

Background, mandate and objective

46. The political and security situation in Burundi remains precarious. The Security Council has expressed concern about the persisting political crisis, as well as an increase in reported cases of violations and abuses of human rights, including

acts of torture, arbitrary arrests and detentions, the restriction of fundamental freedoms, as well as the indiscriminate use of grenade attacks, especially against civilians. The attendant socioeconomic and humanitarian consequences are severe. More than 315,000 refugees have fled the country since the onset of the crisis in April 2015.

47. The Security Council visited Burundi twice in less than a year (March 2015 and January 2016). There have also been visits by the Secretary-General, a delegation of five African Union Heads of State and, in late June 2016, a delegation of the African Union Peace and Security Council. Despite this high-level diplomatic attention, the political crisis in the country remains unresolved.

48. On 6 July 2015, the East African Community designated the President of Uganda as mediator of the inter-Burundi dialogue. On 2 March 2016, the former President of the United Republic of Tanzania was nominated by the East African Community to facilitate the mediation, with the aim of convening a genuine and inclusive dialogue process to forge an agreement between the Burundian stakeholders to end the crisis. Initial dialogue meetings took place in Entebbe, Uganda, on 28 December 2015 and in Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, from 21 to 24 May and from 12 to 14 July 2016.

49. In its resolution 2248 (2015), the Security Council welcomed the decision by the Secretary-General to appoint a special adviser to work with the Government of Burundi and other concerned stakeholders, as well as subregional, regional and other international partners, in support of an inclusive Burundian dialogue and the peaceful resolution of the conflict, and in support of national efforts to build and sustain peace.

50. In the same resolution, the Council requested the Secretary-General to deploy a team in Burundi to coordinate and work with the Government of Burundi, the African Union and other partners to assess the situation and develop options to address political and security options.

51. In his letter dated 1 December 2015 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2015/926), the Secretary-General presented options for a future United Nations presence in the country, which included the deployment to Burundi of a multidimensional integrated peacekeeping operation under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, or a fully-fledged integrated special political mission.

52. In its resolution 2279 (2016), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General, through the good offices of his Special Adviser, to support the inter-Burundian dialogue and, in that regard, to coordinate and work with the East African Community-led, African Union-endorsed Mediator and his Facilitator, as well as with the high-level delegation from the African Union, and to provide technical and substantive support to the mediation. Following the announcement of the launch of the East African Community dialogue to start on 21 May 2016 in Arusha, the Office of Special Adviser has undertaken discussions with the Community to establish a joint East African Community-African Union-United Nations mechanism to support the process.

53. In its resolution 2279 (2016), the Security Council also requested the Secretary-General to enhance the United Nations engagement in Burundi through

strengthening the team of the Special Adviser in order to work with the Government of Burundi and other concerned stakeholders to support the inter-Burundian dialogue, and in the areas of security and rule of law.

54. At the request of the Security Council, on 15 April 2016, the Secretary-General submitted options for the deployment of a United Nations police contribution to increase the United Nations capacity to monitor the security situation, promote the respect for human rights and advance the rule of law (see S/2016/352, annex). The options included a police protection and monitoring presence (approximately 3,000 personnel), a police monitoring presence (228 personnel), and a police assessment presence (20 to 50 personnel).

55. On 29 July 2016, the Security Council adopted resolution 2303 (2016), in which it authorized the deployment of a United Nations police component under the authority of the Office of the Special Adviser. The police component has an authorized ceiling of 228 individual police officers to be deployed in Bujumbura and throughout the country, with the mandate to monitor the security situation and support the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in monitoring violations and abuses of human rights.

56. In the same resolution, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to carry out a risk assessment and, on the basis of that assessment, take the steps necessary for the protection of United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, including the United Nations police component in Burundi.

57. In the resolution, the Security Council also requested the Secretary-General to swiftly implement the strengthening of the Office of the Special Adviser, as referred to in paragraph 10 of resolution 2279 (2016) and paragraph 7 of resolution 2248 (2015), by substantially increasing the number of political officers in Burundi in order to carry out the following tasks: (a) engage with all stakeholders to the crisis, including the Government, opposition, political parties, civil society, religious leaders and others; (b) provide substantive support to the inter-Burundian dialogue; and (c) work with all Burundian parties to develop confidence-building measures to improve the human rights and security situation, and foster an environment conducive to political dialogue.

58. In the resolution, the Council further requested additional reporting, including quarterly reports of the Secretary-General on the situation in Burundi, including on any public incidents of incitements to hatred and violence, and on possible adaptations of the United Nations police component, as well as immediate written reports, as necessary, on grave security incidents, violations of international humanitarian law and violations or abuses of human rights.

Cooperation with other entities

59. The Office of the Special Adviser liaises and coordinates with United Nations regional political offices, including the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa, the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region and the United Nations Office to the African Union to ensure adequate support to regional and subregional initiatives on Burundi. The Office also closely cooperates with the Peacebuilding Commission Configuration on Burundi, OHCHR

and the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide, to promote coherence on Burundian political issues.

60. The Office of the Special Adviser collaborates closely with the office of the United Nations Resident Coordinator and the United Nations country team in Burundi. Where appropriate, synergies have been found with ongoing programmes and projects that are relevant to the implementation of the mandate of the Office. In particular, the Special Adviser continues to rely on technical advice and support from the OHCHR country office to ensure that the respect for human rights is mainstreamed into all activities.

61. In its resolution 2303 (2016), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to develop options to enable the United Nations to facilitate the deployment of African Union human rights and military observers and modalities for cooperation between the United Nations police component, under the authority of the Office of the Special Adviser, and the African Union observers. At the Headquarters level, the Special Adviser has regularly chaired the Inter-Agency Task Force on Burundi, which includes representatives of all relevant Secretariat departments and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes. The Special Adviser has convened coordination meetings with the numerous international envoys to Burundi, as well as with regional and subregional partners based in Addis Ababa and elsewhere.

62. To promote efficiency and avoid duplication, the staff members of the Office of the Special Adviser deployed in Burundi is serviced by the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe. The small office support team deployed in Bujumbura supports the day-to-day administrative and logistical needs of the team, undertaking those functions that cannot be performed remotely and providing an administrative link with the Regional Service Centre.

Performance information

63. The Special Adviser's team deployed to Burundi in January 2016. The team started working in the country, building relations with the key stakeholders. The Office of the Special Adviser has received full cooperation from the Government and other stakeholders. On 24 January 2016, the President of Burundi wrote to the President of the Security Council to indicate that he had given instructions to the officials of the national authorities concerned to make themselves available to the Special Adviser and to cooperate closely with his team in order to jointly determine the assistance required to support the inclusive national dialogue process and efforts in the areas of disarmament, security, human rights and development.

64. The Office of the Special Adviser has established a close working relationship with the Office of the East African Community Facilitator and discussed technical and substantive support to the mediation. The former President of the United Republic of Tanzania convened a dialogue session with Burundian stakeholders from 21 to 24 May, with the aim of reaching a decision on the agenda, venue and participation in the process. The Government of Burundi, former presidents of Burundi and representatives of political parties and civil society organizations, including religious groups, attended the dialogue session. However, not all key stakeholders participated in the meeting. The Office of the Special Adviser is

expected to continue to provide technical and substantive support for additional dialogue sessions projected to take place during the remainder of 2016.

65. Following a series of high-level visits from, respectively, the Security Council, an African Union delegation of four sitting presidents and one prime minister, and the United Nations Secretary-General, to Burundi in the first quarter of 2016, there is significant international support for the East African Union-led, African Union-endorsed mediation and for the conduct of an inclusive and genuine inter-Burundian dialogue.

66. On 23 February 2016, during the Secretary-General's visit, the President of Burundi announced that the Government would release political prisoners, allow two independent media stations to resume operations, and suspend the arrest warrants of some opposition figures. These measures are viewed as important confidence-building measures to promote dialogue. The Office of the Special Adviser, in collaboration with OHCHR, continues to monitor their implementation.

67. In response to a request from the Security Council in its resolution 2279 (2016), the Secretary-General, on 15 April 2016, provided options for the deployment of a police contribution in Burundi, as detailed above. The Council subsequently adopted resolution 2303 (2016), in which it authorized the deployment of up to 228 individual police officers to be deployed in Bujumbura and throughout the country.

Planning assumptions for 2017

68. The Office of the Special Adviser has developed its support plan to the political dialogue process, on the basis of consultations with key stakeholders in Burundi and in the region, as well as with the East African Community and the African Union, and drawing on lessons learned from previous dialogue initiatives in Burundi and elsewhere. The plan identifies preparatory steps, options for format, participation and agenda as well as modalities for providing technical and substantive support.

69. The Office of the Special Adviser has also developed its workplan for 2016, which sets out the deliverables, timelines and division of responsibilities, relating to the assessment of the situation, supporting dialogue and engaging on security issues, and ensuring complementarity with regional partners.

70. The Office of the Special Adviser will reinforce its capacity to support the East African Community-led, African Union-endorsed mediation, particularly in the key areas of substantive and thematic expertise, conference services and public information.

71. The Office of the Special Adviser will also regularly review its analysis, including in support of contingency plans, consistent with resolutions 2248 (2015) and 2279 (2016), to enable the international community to respond to any further deterioration in the situation. The Office will reinforce the quality and scope of its analysis and outreach through the deployment of political officers to the local offices of the country team in Gitega, Ngozi and Makamba to monitor the situation and engage with local actors.

72. Major cost drivers that would affect planning include logistics arrangements, more frequent travel within Burundi, the region and internationally, as required, as

well as other staff and operational costs to meet the requirements of the mandate as the Burundi political dialogue progresses. Cost drivers are also associated with plans to move to a new compound in Bujumbura in 2016.

73. The support component will continue to ensure timely management and coordination and the provision of administrative and technical support for the successful implementation of the mandate of the Office of the Special Adviser. The Office will ensure the effective use of videoconferencing services to reduce the cost of travelling and benefit through the remote training services provided by United Nations Headquarters, the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi and the United Nations Support Base in Valencia. The Office will continue to utilize the supply chain, cashier, finance, and procurement services of the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe as much as applicable in order to exploit the capabilities and expertise of the Centre.

74. The objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures of the Office are set out below.

Table 4
Objectives, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures

Objective: To support the Government of Burundi and other stakeholders in establishing a credible and inclusive political dialogue process that is nationally owned, while security and rule of law institutions are strengthened.

Expected accomplishments	*Indicators of achievement*		*Performance measures*		
			2017	*2016*	*2015*
(a) Establishment of a credible and inclusive political dialogue process that is nationally owned and internationally accepted	(i) Agreement on process, structure and timeline for a political dialogue process	Target	Yes	Yes	
		Estimate		No	
		Actual			
	(ii) Dialogue sessions are convened with the participation of key stakeholders	Target	6	4	
		Estimate		4	
		Actual			
	(iii) Key international and regional partners jointly support the process	Target	Yes	Yes	
		Estimate		No	
		Actual			
(b) Successful maintenance of political interaction between United Nations and Burundian counterparts with the goal of promoting respect for the Constitution and the Arusha Agreement	(i) Efforts are undertaken by the United Nations to work with all Burundian parties to develop confidence-building measures to engage in political dialogue	Target	Yes		
		Estimate		Yes	
		Actual			
	(ii) The Security Council receives regular reports by the Secretary-General on the implementation of applicable resolutions and is informed immediately, as necessary, on grave security incidents, violations of international humanitarian law and violations or abuses of human rights	Target	Yes		
		Estimate		Yes	
		Actual			

Outputs

- Promotion of a political solution to the Burundian crisis with key stakeholders through visits to Burundi and regional countries (6)
- Meetings with the African Union and the East African Community, with a view to operationalizing a joint mechanism in support of the Burundian dialogue process (6)
- Provision of support to the joint mechanism in the areas of substantive and thematic expertise, conference services and public communications
- Coordination meetings chaired together with international partners to develop consensus on international responses (12)
- Consultations with national authorities, political parties and civil society organizations, including representatives of women and youth groups and media outlets, to engage all segments of Burundian society in the national dialogue process (6)
- Provision of advice to national authorities and other stakeholders on issues pertaining to the national dialogue
- Briefings to the Security Council, the General Assembly and other relevant United Nations bodies, as well as to regional organizations, on the political and security situation in Burundi and the efforts of the Special Adviser (6)
- Public awareness-raising initiatives for the Burundian population, including public information activities that stress the importance of political dialogue and an end to violence and human rights violations
- Consultations with national authorities to raise concerns relating to the security and rule of law situation (10)
- Consultations with national authorities on measures to enhance accountability and to mainstream human rights (10)
- Meetings with political parties and civil society organizations, including representatives of women, youth and media, to ensure that their security concerns are taken into consideration (6)
- Meetings with representatives of national security and defence forces to identify risks and seek appropriate solutions (12)
- Meetings with representatives of national security and defence forces to integrate gender into the security and defence architecture (12)
- Coordination meetings with bilateral and multilateral partners that are undertaking security sector programming to ensure coherence in approaches (12)

External factors

75. The objective is expected to be achieved provided that there is no delay in or failure of the East African Community-led dialogue process, no withdrawal of cooperation from the Government of Burundi and no deterioration in the security situation that would reduce the ability of the Office of the Special Adviser to operate in Burundi; and there is continuing support from the international community.

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 5
Financial resources
(Thousands of United States dollars)

	1 January-31 December 2016			*Requirements for 1 January-31 December 2017*				
Category	*Appropriation* (1)	*Estimated expenditure* (2)	*Variance* (3)=(1)-(2)	*Appropriation 2016* (4)=(1)	*Total requirements* (5)	*Non-recurrent requirements* (6)	*Variance (2017-2016)* (7)=(5)-(4)	*Net requirements for 2017*[a] (8)=(5)-(3)
Civilian personnel costs	3 202.8	3 289.8	(87.0)	3 202.8	5 555.1	–	2 352.3	5 642.1
Operational costs	4 560.9	4 258.9	302.0	4 560.9	6 372.0	426.8	1 811.1	6 070.0
Total	**7 763.7**	**7 548.7**	**215.0**	**7 763.7**	**11 927.1**	**426.8**	**4 163.4**	**11 712.1**

[a] Net requirements after taking into account the estimated underexpenditure or overexpenditure for 2016.

Table 6
Positions

	Professional and higher categories								*General Service and related categories*			*National staff*			
	USG	*ASG*	*D-2*	*D-1*	*P-5*	*P-4*	*P-3*	*P-2*	***Subtotal***	*Field Security Service*	*General Service*	***Subtotal international***	*National Officer*	*Local level*	*United Nations Volunteers*	***Total***
Approved 2016	1	–	1	2	6	6	2	–	**18**	7	1	**26**	2	5	–	**33**
Proposed 2017	1	–	1	2	8	13	4	–	**29**	12	2	**43**	3	7	–	**53**
Change	–	–	–	–	**2**	**7**	**2**	–	**11**	**5**	**1**	**17**	**1**	**2**	–	**20**

76. The unencumbered balance in 2016 reflects mainly (a) a reduction in travel owing to a lower tempo of political discussions; (b) a limited movement of staff by ground transportation as the result of a heightened security situation in the region; and (c) a delay in the deployment of communications assets owing to the prioritization of the deployment of assets to Bujumbura and postponing deployment to the regions, offset in part by an increase under civilian personnel as the result of actual vacancy rates for all categories of positions that are lower than budgeted.

77. The proposed resources for 2017 for the Office of the Special Adviser amount to $11,927,100 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for the salaries and common staff costs for the continuation of 33 positions and the proposed establishment of 20 additional positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 D-2, 2 D-1, 8 P-5, 13 P-4, 4 P-3, 12 Field Service, 2 General Service, 3 National Officer, 7 Local level) ($5,555,100), as well as for operational costs ($6,372,000), comprising consultants ($370,600), official travel ($1,797,000), facilities and infrastructure ($2,049,100), ground transportation ($364,300), communications ($589,200), information technology ($550,400), medical ($247,200), and other supplies, services and equipment ($404,200).

78. The Security Council, in its resolution 2303 (2016), requested the Secretary-General to swiftly implement the strengthening of the Office of the Special Adviser by substantially increasing the number of political officers in Burundi and to carry out a risk assessment and, on the basis of that assessment, take the steps necessary for the protection of United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, including the United Nations police component in Burundi. Accordingly, the Office of the Special Adviser for 2017 proposes to include a total of 20 new positions (2 P-5, 7 P-4, 2 P-3, 5 Field Service, 1 General Service (Other level), 1 National Professional Officer and 2 Local level).

New York

79. Three new positions (1 P-4, 1 P-3 and 1 General Service (Other level)), to be based in New York, are proposed for the Office of the Special Adviser, for planning for a United Nations police contribution and analysis of information. Furthermore, one new position (P-3), to be located in the Africa I Division of the Department of Political Affairs, is proposed to provide backstopping support to the Office of the Special Adviser.

Burundi — Office of the Head of Office

80. One new position (National Professional Officer), to be based in Burundi, is proposed for the protocol function and liaison with national counterparts.

Burundi — Dialogue Support Unit

81. Five new positions (1 P-5 and 4 P-4), to be based in Burundi, are proposed for the purpose of coordination, mediation support, and presence in three regional offices (Gitega, Ngozi and Makamba) for engaging with local-level stakeholders.

Burundi — Security and Rule of Law Unit

82. Five new positions (1 P-5, 2 P-4 and 2 Field Service), to be based in Burundi, are proposed for the Security and Rule of Law Unit, for liaising with the Government of Burundi and other stakeholders and advising on the development, implementation and evaluation of rule-of-law activities in line with international norms and standards, information analysis related to security and the rule of law.

Burundi — Mission Support Section

83. Three new positions (1 Field Service and 2 Local level), to be based in Burundi, are proposed for managing transport and maintenance, and administrative and information technology support.

Burundi — Staff Security and Safety Unit

84. Two new positions of Security Officer (2 Field Service), based in Burundi, are proposed for strengthening the Staff Security and Safety Unit and liaising with the Department of Safety and Security of the United Nations Secretariat in order to apply the standards of the United Nations Security Management System in Burundi.

Redeployment (between locations)

85. It is proposed that two Political Affairs Officers (1 P-5 and 1 P-4) of the Mediation Support Team be redeployed from Nairobi to Burundi. The Mediation Support Team contributes to efforts of the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General for Conflict Prevention, including in Burundi, to provide technical and substantive support to the mediation.

86. The variance (increase) between the requirements for 2017 and the approved budget for 2016 is attributable mainly to (a) the proposed increase in the number of positions; (b) the recruitment of additional consultants; (c) the increase of official travel owing to a growth in the number of expected consultations and dialogue meetings; (d) the increased number of locations that the rental of premises have to be provided for; (e) the acquisition of new information technology equipment; and (f) the usage of information technology personnel that are contracted internationally and locally.

Extrabudgetary resources

87. No extrabudgetary resources were available in 2016 or are projected for 2017 for the Office.

II. Action requested of the General Assembly

88. **The General Assembly is requested:**

(a) **To approve the budgets for the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen and the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General for Conflict Prevention, including in Burundi, for 2017 amounting to $27,414,400, net of staff assessment;**

(b) **To appropriate, under the procedures provided for in paragraph 11 of annex I to resolution 41/213, an additional amount of $28,385,700 (net of staff assessment) under section 3, Political affairs, of the programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017, after taking into account the estimated overexpenditure in 2016 amounting to $971,300;**

(c) **To appropriate an amount of $2,075,000 under section 36, Staff assessment, to be offset by a corresponding amount under income section 1, Income from staff assessment, of the programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017.**

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Estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council

Thematic cluster III: United Nations offices, peacebuilding support offices, integrated offices and commissions

United Nations Mission in Colombia

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report contains the proposed resource requirements for the United Nations Mission in Colombia for 2017, amounting to $67,252,100 gross ($64,167,300 net).

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I. Special political missions

United Nations Mission in Colombia

($64,167,300 net)

Background, mandate and objective

1. By its resolution 2261 (2016), the Security Council established a political mission of unarmed international observers to be the international component and coordinator of the tripartite mechanism that would monitor and verify the definitive bilateral ceasefire and cessation of hostilities between the Government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia — People's Army (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia — Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP)). The Security Council also mandated the mission to monitor and verify the laying down of arms. The resolution established an initial mandate of 12 months for the mission, which commenced following the signing of the peace agreement between the Government of Colombia and FARC-EP, on 26 September 2016.

2. On 31 October 2016, through an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2016/902 and S/2016/923), the Council authorized the United Nations Mission in Colombia, as part of the tripartite Monitoring and Verification Mechanism established under the Agreement on the Bilateral and Definitive Ceasefire and the Cessation of Hostilities and the Laying Down of Arms, to commence the monitoring and verification of the ceasefire. The request for the activation of the tripartite Mechanism was made by the Government of Colombia and FARC-EP in their joint communiqué of 7 October 2016, following the rejection of the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace by a narrow margin, in a plebiscite held on 2 October 2016. Negotiations are ongoing between the Government and FARC-EP as well as with opposition groups on a revised agreement or set of agreements. The United Nations Mission in Colombia has been undertaking ceasefire monitoring and verification activities, within the tripartite Mechanism, since 7 November 2016. The present proposal does not include provisions for the monitoring and verification of the laying down of arms by FARC-EP, which would begin following the entry into force of the revised peace agreement, which was signed in Bogota on 24 November 2016 and is awaiting ratification by the Congress of Colombia.

3. The Government of Colombia and FARC-EP have been engaged in peace talks since 2012. The talks have focused on a six-point agenda, which includes point 5, on the end of the conflict, including the bilateral ceasefire and the laying down of arms. The peace talks were conducted in a bilateral manner between the Government of Colombia and FARC-EP. Norway and Cuba acted as guarantor countries, with the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Chile as accompanying countries.

4. In July 2015, the parties invited the United Nations to contribute to the discussions on verification and monitoring mechanisms held in the subcommission on end of conflict issues. The Secretary-General appointed Jean Arnault as his delegate to the subcommission. On 19 January 2016, the parties announced their decision to request the establishment of a United Nations political mission, made up of unarmed observers primarily from member countries of the Community of Latin

American and Caribbean States (CELAC) (see S/2016/53). The Mission would constitute the international component of a tripartite Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, with the participation of members of the Government of Colombia and FARC-EP, to oversee the bilateral ceasefire and definitive cessation of hostilities and, in its own capacity, to verify the laying down of arms.

5. In response to that request, on 25 January 2016, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2261 (2016), in which it decided to establish a political mission. Prior to the adoption of a final peace agreement, the Council, in resolution 2261 (2016), requested the Secretary-General to initiate preparations immediately, including on the ground, and to present detailed recommendations to the Council for its consideration and approval regarding the size, operational aspects and mandate of the Mission.

6. The Mission deployed an advance team and initiated mission start-up activities in Bogota. Recommendations on the size, operational aspects and mandate of the Mission were transmitted to the Security Council in a letter dated 22 July 2016 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Council (S/2016/643) and further detailed in the report of the Secretary-General (S/2016/729). The recommendations were approved by the Council in its resolution 2307 (2016). The Mission established a presence in Bogota and eight regions, with preparations on the ground calibrated to advances in the peace process.

7. On 26 September 2016, the President of Colombia and the leader of FARC-EP signed the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace. The peace agreement included the Agreement on the Bilateral and Definitive Ceasefire and the Cessation of Hostilities and the Laying Down of Arms, the provisions of which, along with a set of protocols agreed separately between the parties, provided the framework for the operations of the Monitoring and Verification Mechanism. One of the terms of the peace agreement was that its entry into force was to be subject to a plebiscite conducted in accordance with the modalities decided by the Constitutional Court.

8. In the plebiscite, which was held a week later, on 2 October 2016, the electorate rejected the peace agreement, with 50.25 per cent voting against and 49.75 per cent in favour. Thus, under the terms decided by the Constitutional Court, the agreement in its current form cannot be implemented. In response to the results of the plebiscite, the parties reconvened in Havana on 3 October 2016. Their discussions resulted in a joint communiqué, dated 7 October 2016, in which the following actions were outlined: (a) the establishment of a Government-led political dialogue with those who voted "no" in the plebiscite and the citizenry at large that could lead the parties to make adjustments in the peace agreement signed on 26 September 2016; (b) the design of a temporary protocol, establishing a clear separation of forces, rules of behaviour and the application of the tripartite monitoring mechanism referred to in resolution 2261 (2016), to consolidate the definitive bilateral ceasefire and cessation of hostilities and guarantee the security of both sides and the protection of communities in the conflict areas; and (c) the continuation of a series of confidence-building measures that had been put in place over the course of the previous year, such as humanitarian demining, the voluntary substitution of illicit crops, the release of minors from FARC-EP camps and the search for disappeared people, among other measures. In the same communiqué, the

two parties requested the Secretary-General and, through him, the Security Council to authorize the United Nations Mission in Colombia to monitor and verify the ceasefire and its protocol as the coordinator of the tripartite Monitoring and Verification Mechanism.

9. On 13 October 2016, the parties, along with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, signed a Protocol for the Bilateral and Definitive Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities. The protocol sets out the commitment of the parties to observe the ceasefire and cessation of hostility provisions of the Agreement on the Bilateral and Definitive Ceasefire and the Cessation of Hostilities and the Laying Down of Arms. This includes commitments to refrain from a series of acts that could lead to armed confrontation, to refrain from any violence and threat of violence that may put the civilian population at risk, particularly acts motivated by gender, and a commitment to guarantee the security of all members of the tripartite Mechanism, responsible for verifying the ceasefire agreement, including the Mission's observers.

10. The basic tasks of the Mission would be those described in the report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council (S/2016/729), namely (a) organizing the operations of the Mechanism, taking into account the coordination of tasks, threat analysis and logistical requirements; (b) monitoring the local sites and visiting FARC-EP camps; (c) monitoring the security zones and visiting redeployed army units; and (d) visiting neighbouring population centres in order to interact with the local population and authorities.

11. Under the protocol adopted on 13 October 2016, monitoring and verification would primarily take place in the environs of between 50 and 60 temporary pre-grouping positions, rather than the 27 transitional zones and points for normalization identified in the peace agreement. Verification of the separation of forces and compliance with the ceasefire rules would therefore entail periodic visits by the Mechanism, at the local headquarters level, to the temporary pre-grouping positions, the size of which would be larger than initially envisaged and would encompass the areas where FARC-EP are grouped, the 3-km-wide security zone and the areas of operations of military units.

12. Following the request to the Security Council in the joint communiqué and the signature of the protocol, as outlined above, the Secretary-General submitted a letter to the President of the Council, on 26 October 2016, recommending that the Council act expeditiously to authorize the United Nations Mission in Colombia to monitor and verify the implementation of the ceasefire, in accordance with the mandate previously defined in its resolutions 2261 (2016) and 2307 (2016) (S/2016/902). On 31 October 2016, the President of the Council responded with a letter authorizing the Mission to commence monitoring and observation activities in accordance with the request of the parties (S/2016/923). Implementation of the ceasefire monitoring role is a contribution that the United Nations has been making to the maintenance of calm on the ground in advance of the signature of the revised peace agreement, on 24 November 2016, which will be continued subsequent to the ratification and implementation of that agreement. The maintenance, monitoring and verification of the ceasefire by the Mechanism, with the United Nations as its international component, is helping to build confidence between the parties and remove any

uncertainty about the parties' commitment to peace and the commitment of the international community to supporting the entire peace process.

Cooperation with other entities

13. At the request of the Government of Colombia and FARC-EP and in keeping with Security Council resolutions 2261 (2016) and 2307 (2016), the Mission and the United Nations at Headquarters are continuing to engage closely with the members of CELAC and other interested Member States on the nomination and deployment of appropriately qualified observers for service with the Mission.

14. The Mission continues to maintain very close contact with the United Nations country team. It has benefited from the significant experience and expertise of the country team in terms of both logistics and operations, as well as their detailed knowledge of the conflict and local dynamics. The Mission and country team would have liaison mechanisms at the national level and in the departments and municipalities in which the Mission would be present. Moreover, the Mission would seek the continuation of country team support to participate in the training of observers and Mission staff on such issues as gender, challenges to the civilian population in conflict areas, the protection of children and the impact of illegal drugs.

15. Building upon the results of the scoping visits to local sites, the Mission would engage regularly with national, regional and local authorities, actors and the wider public, to foster awareness of the peace process, address questions and dispel misgivings that may exist with regard to the Mission's role, responsibilities and other concerns that would inevitably surface during the process of implementation.

16. As approved in Security Council resolution 2307 (2016), the Government of Colombia and the Mission would share the costs of activating and operating the Mechanism, exclusive of Government-provided security costs, in proportion to the number of national and international personnel in the Mechanism. Current planning indicates that the Mission's usage of facilities and infrastructure would be approximately 50 per cent of the total requirement. Furthermore, and in order to ensure the expeditious deployment of the Mechanism, resolution 2307 (2016) authorizes the Mission to share equally with the Government of Colombia the support required for the preparation and facilities management of the transitional zones and transitional points for normalization, for a 12-month period, which began on 26 September 2016, as authorized in Council resolution 2261 (2016).

Performance information

17. Since the deployment of an advance team to Bogota in February 2016 and the subsequent opening of the United Nations Mission in Colombia, the Mission has undertaken a broad range of planning and preparatory activities in preparation for the two tasks of ceasefire monitoring and verification of the laying down of arms. Working closely with FARC-EP as well as the Government of Colombia, more specifically the Presidency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the High Commissioner for Peace, the police and the military, and the Peace Fund, the Mission has progressively developed plans and preparations for the role, structure, funding

model, operational needs and activation timeline for the tripartite Mechanism and additional obligations for the Mission itself, including the arms laydown process.

18. The recruitment of staff and training of arriving unarmed military and police observers has been a continuing focus of work of the advance team and the Mission. Subsequent efforts have focused on establishing a United Nations presence at the national, regional and local levels. After initial co-location with the United Nations Development Programme, the Mission established its national headquarters in August 2016. Staff and observers from the Mission have undertaken numerous visits to proposed locations for regional and local sites for the Mechanism. This has resulted in the establishment of six out of eight regional headquarters. The remaining two regional headquarters have formally defined their location and are currently operating from temporary offices while the headquarters are prepared. Detailed reconnaissance visits have been undertaken to 24 of the 27 proposed local zones and points identified in the peace agreements and related protocols, with the remaining three visits scheduled to be completed prior to the end of 2016. All of the visits have been undertaken in a tripartite manner, with representatives of the Mission, the Government and FARC-EP. Most recently, the Mission has been undertaking finalization and confirmation visits to the temporary team sites for the Mechanism (offices and accommodation facilities) in the local sites, with a view to starting to occupy those locations and commencing operations at the local level by the end of the year.

19. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General and a small team of advisers have continued to engage extensively in the development of the peace agreement. This has involved numerous trips to Havana to assist the parties in the drafting and formulation of the aspects set out in the peace agreement referring to the ceasefires and the laying down of arms and the monitoring of both activities. Significant engagement was also required to develop a series of protocols, which were to guide the implementation of the agreement and its operationalization. Most significantly, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and his team flew to Havana the day after the holding of the plebiscite, to work closely with government and FARC-EP counterparts. Within a week, the parties issued a communiqué reiterating their commitment to the ceasefire and requesting that the Security Council authorize the Mission to commence ceasefire monitoring and verification activities while the remainder of the peace agreement was renegotiated. Throughout the planning and preparatory phase, at both the national and regional levels, the Mission has undertaken extensive engagement with civil society, indigenous groups, religious leaders, community leaders, political leaders, activists and non-governmental organizations. It has worked closely with the United Nations country team and media actors to inform the population of the role of the Mission and the Mechanism. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General and a small team of advisers have also continued to engage extensively with Colombian actors in the development of the peace agreement.

Planning assumptions for 2017

20. The protocol of 13 October 2016 defines a transitional separation of forces that is to serve as a bridge between the current situation, in which the deployment of FARC-EP structures is too dispersed throughout the country for the ceasefire to be

reliably verified, and the separation of forces foreseen in the Agreement on the Bilateral and Definitive Ceasefire and the Cessation of Hostilities and the Laying Down of Arms, which will begin upon entry into force of the new peace agreement. The protocol defines that FARC-FP would move their fighters and militias to between 50 and 60 temporary pre-grouping points, whose number and locations are yet to be finalized. The armed forces would redeploy their units so that there would be a minimum distance of 3 km between them and FARC-EP camps established at each point. The points are to be situated in relative proximity, to the extent possible, to the 27 local zones and points where, under the peace agreement, FARC-EP was to gather its fighters and militias and the United Nations Mission in Colombia to receive their weapons.

21. For the first 30 days after the signing of the protocol, FARC-EP would be responsible for providing logistical support to the temporary pre-grouping points. Thereafter, the Government would take over the responsibility for the supply of necessary logistics to the pre-grouping points.

22. In order to deliver the tasks set out in the letter of the Secretary-General of 26 October 2016 (S/2016/902) and approved by the Security Council in its letter of 31 October 2016 (S/2016/923), the Mission and the Mechanism would adopt a phased approach to activating and operationalizing the Mechanism. In phase 1, those temporary pre-grouping points that are within daily commuting distance from one of the eight established regional headquarters for the Mission would be visited by tripartite observation teams, working out of the regional headquarters. In phase 2, temporary team sites for the Mechanism would be progressively established in each of the 27 transitional zones and points for normalization. Once established, the local team sites would be used as bases to mount monitoring and verification patrols in the pre-grouping points. Phase 3 would be the construction and operation of fixed team sites for the Mechanism in all 27 zones and points. Initial planning with the Government of Colombia indicates that phase 3 may be complete and all team sites working at full operational capacity by the end of January 2017.

23. In order to provide the appropriate level of engagement and credibility, each of the temporary pre-grouping points would be visited on a regular basis. In early 2017, once the team sites for the Mechanism are ready to be occupied, the full complement of United Nations observers would be deployed. Up to 12 United Nations observers, in coordination with observers from the Government and FARC-EP, would be deployed to each of the team sites. This number and distribution of observers is required in order to enable the conduct of multiple patrols to the pre-grouping points, to maintain a command post during operational activities, to engage with local communities and stakeholders and to maintain the flexibility to be able to respond to reports of potential violations and undertake investigations, where appropriate. The number also takes into account allowing for leave and compensatory time off as specified in the United Nations regulations governing such matters. The number of observers and the tasks outlined above represent the full operating capacity of the Mechanism.

24. In order to fulfil the tasks required for the verification of the protocol of 13 October 2016, as briefly outlined above, the Mission would require 400 observers. An additional 50 observers would be needed when the laying down of arms begins. The 400 observers must be given sufficient logistical support as they would be

covering a large number of sites in remote areas (50-60 temporary pre-grouping points, grouped around some 27 sites or points).

25. At the national level and within each of the eight regional headquarters for the Mechanism, there would be teams responsible for communications, threat analysis, operations, planning, logistical coordination and interaction with departmental authorities and civil society organizations. The number of observers for the Mechanism in each regional headquarters would be determined on the basis of the number of zones, points and temporary pre-grouping points under their responsibility. It is anticipated that the Mission would require an average of 11 observers and 9 civilian staff in each regional headquarters. The Government of Colombia and FARC-EP would each deploy an average of six observers to each of the regional headquarters.

26. In addition to the tasks outlined above, the national headquarters of the Mechanism, based in Bogota, would assume the overall direction and coordination of the Mechanism. Once fully operational, it would also host a specialist information management capability, public information staff and a multi-disciplinary investigation team that would support regional and local headquarters for the Mechanism in investigating alleged violations of the ceasefire and of the cessation of hostilities.

27. United Nations civilian staff would work alongside United Nations observers at all levels, collectively supporting the implementation of the mandate as the international component and coordinator of the Mechanism. The Mission is already operational in the national headquarters and eight regional offices. In those locations, the work of civilian staff encompasses analysis, political engagement, strategic and operational planning, public information, community and interest group engagement, coordination with the country team, the provision of mission support and the coordination of mission security. In order to perform those functions, the Mission requires 122 staff and United Nations Volunteers (UNV) at the national level and between 8 and 9 staff in each of the eight regional offices (68 staff and UNVs). At the local level, United Nations observers would be supported by up to 3 civilian staff or UNVs, who would provide direct support to the Mechanism as well as undertake in-depth engagement with the local civilian population (132 staff and UNVs).

Mission support

28. The mission support concept is premised upon the Government of Colombia being the primary provider of infrastructure and services to the Mission and to the Mechanism, with the United Nations providing services where the Organization has a comparative advantage in terms of timeliness and cost. The Mission has been planned with the expectation of a significant amount of logistical support from the Government of Colombia. The nature and extent of that support would be captured in a letter of assist between the Government and the Mission that, as of the time of writing, is under discussion. The letter would specify who would provide which services to the monitoring and verification effort and at what cost. Such an approach is intended to ensure the timely activation of the Mission and the Mechanism, to keep the costs to the Organization to a minimum and to ensure the rapid drawdown of the Mission upon completion of its mandate. There is an inherent risk with such an approach, in that the Mission is reliant on a provider who is a party to the

conflict for the effective operation of the Mission and the Mechanism and it may require that some mitigation measures be put in place, in case such measures need to be activated on short notice. The Mission plans to put prenegotiated commercial contracts in place as a contingency.

Security

29. The Government of Colombia, and specifically the national police, would assume responsibility for the security of the Mechanism and the Mission at large. At the national headquarters and at selected regional headquarters, external security provided by the National Police is already in place. At the local level, the National Police would escort the Mechanism on all tasks in order to ensure the safety and security of all Mechanism personnel. Very thorough and productive discussions have taken place between the Colombian authorities and the Department of Safety and Security with regard to security guarantees for United Nations staff and observers.

Laying down of arms

30. The Mission would continue planning for the task of monitoring the laying down of arms and engage with the parties on preparations for the next stages, including the movement into zones where the laying down of arms would occur upon the entry into force of the revised peace agreement signed on 24 November.

31. The objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures for the Mission are set out below.

Table 1
Objectives, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures

Objective: To implement the definitive and bilateral ceasefire and cessation of hostilities

Expected accomplishments	*Indicators of achievement*	*Performance measures*	*2017*	*2016*	*2015*
(a) Compliance of both parties to the conflict with the definitive and bilateral ceasefire and cessation of hostilities, including the ceasefire protocol of 13 October 2016	(i) Number of cases of serious violations of the ceasefire agreement confirmed by the Mechanism	Target	0		
		Estimate			
		Actual			
	(ii) Limited geographical distribution of violations, with violations in less than 25 per cent of the transitional local zones for normalization and transitional local points for normalization	Target	Yes		
		Estimate			
		Actual			
	(iii) Number of violations known to be authorized by senior leaders within the parties to the conflict	Target	0		
		Estimate			
		Actual			
	(iv) FARC-EP members remain in agreed areas of separation in accordance with the ceasefire protocol	Target	Yes		
		Estimate			
		Actual			

	(v) Percentage of FARC-EP members reported as unaccounted for in spot checks and visits conducted by the Mechanism in encampment zones	Target	Less than 5 per cent
		Estimate	
		Actual	
	(vi) Number of FARC-EP personnel that the Mechanism encounters in uniform or with a weapon outside of the agreed separation of forces area per 1,000 FARC-EP personnel in camps	Target	Less than 1
		Estimate	
		Actual	
	(vii) Number of FARC-EP personnel that the Mechanism encounters in the security zone per 1,000 FARC-EP personnel in camps	Target	Less than 1
		Estimate	
		Actual	
	(viii) Government military force remains in agreed areas of separation in accordance with the ceasefire protocol (with the exception of the Mechanism security teams)	Target	Yes
		Estimate	
		Actual	
	(ix) Number of Government military forces that the Mechanism encounters outside of the agreed separation of forces area per 1,000 personnel	Target	Less than 1
		Estimate	
		Actual	
	(x) Number of Government Military Forces that the Mechanism encounters in the security zone per 1,000 personnel	Target	Less than 1
		Estimate	
		Actual	
(b) Effective implementation of the tripartite mechanism established by the parties to monitor and verify the ceasefire agreement	(i) Percentage of reported cases of alleged serious violations that resulted in an investigation by the Mechanism	Target	0 per cent
		Estimate	
		Actual	
	(ii) Alleged serious violations are investigated on a timely basis (started within 2 days)	Target	Yes
		Estimate	
		Actual	
	(iii) Widespread acceptance of the Mechanism across the population, Government of Colombia and FARC-EP	Target	Yes
		Estimate	
		Actual	
	(iv) International stakeholders support and engagement with guarantor and accompanying countries	Target	Yes
		Estimate	
		Actual	
	(v) Percentage of disagreements over alleged violations that are resolved through the Mechanism's dispute resolution process	Target	75 per cent
		Estimate	
		Actual	

Outputs

- Weekly reports on adherence and suspected violations (Mechanism and United Nations)
- Monthly analytical reports to the parties on adherence and suspected violations (United Nations)

- Monthly briefings to key domestic stakeholders (including community groups, non-governmental organizations, civil society organizations and the church) on adherence (Mechanism and United Nations, separately)
- Monthly briefing to key international stakeholders (including Member States, regional organizations, international non-governmental organizations and international academic institutes) on adherence (United Nations)
- 40 workshops/training sessions for all Mechanism parties at the national, regional and local levels on the monitoring and verification process (Mechanism)
- 27 awareness briefings with FARC-EP and Government commanders on how the Mechanism would operate and on the shared understanding of what constitutes a violation
- Daily patrols of the zones, points and from 27 Mechanism team sites
- Daily patrols of the security zone (Mechanism) from 27 Mechanism team sites
- Daily patrols and office working hours in local villages (including United Nations civilians) to receive reports of complaints and alleged violations of the ceasefire from third parties (individuals and organizations) from 27 Mechanism team sites
- 20 tripartite investigations and reports into violations that require technical expertise and cannot be resolved at the local level (Mechanism)
- Regular spot checks and visits to FARC-EP camps by the Mechanism to monitor the presence of FARC-EP members in accordance with the agreed separation of forces
- Monthly trend analysis and regular reports to the parties and to the Security Council on compliance with the ceasefire agreement by the parties, the laying down of arms and progress in implementation of the Mission's mandate
- Regular media briefings and press conferences on issues related to the monitoring and verification of the ceasefire and the laying down of arms
- Daily monitoring and analysis of media coverage and public perceptions related to the implementation of the ceasefire and final peace agreements

External factors

32. The Mission is expected to achieve its objective and expected accomplishments provided that (a) the parties remain committed to adhering to the ceasefire agreement; (b) there is timely consideration and ratification by Congress of the revised peace agreement; (c) the Government of Colombia provides the logistic and operational support required to start up and maintain the operations of the Monitoring and Verification Mechanism; (d) the parties abide by the protocols and timelines agreed to for the implementation of the ceasefire agreement; and (e) the security situation remains calm and stable in areas traditionally held by FARC-EP where there is also the presence of other rebel groups, such as the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)), and criminal gangs (bandas criminales, also referred to as BACRIM).

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 2
Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	1 January-31 December 2016			Requirements for 1 January-31 December 2017				
	Appropriations	Estimated expenditure[a]	Variance	Appropriation 2016	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	Variance (2017-2016)	Net requirements for 2017[b]
Category	(1)	(2)	(3)=(1)-(2)	(4)=(1)	(5)	(6)	(7)=(5)-(4)	(8)=(5)-(3)
Military observers	–	2 275.4	(2 275.4)	–	11 138.7	–	11 138.7	13 414.1
Civilian personnel costs	–	3 212.2	(3 212.2)	–	22 028.3	–	22 028.3	25 240.5
Operational costs	–	9 139.6	(9 139.6)	–	31 000.3	129.3	31 000.3	40 139.9
Total	**–**	**14 627.2**	**(14 627.2)**	**–**	**64 167.3**	**129.3**	**64 167.3**	**78 794.5**

[a] The amount of estimated expenditures corresponds to the amount of commitment authorities approved to date and the additional commitment authority, submitted for the approval of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.

[b] Net requirements after taking into account the estimated underexpenditure or overexpenditure for 2016.

Table 3
Positions

	Professional categories and above								General service and related category			National staff		United Nations Volunteers		
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	Total	Field Security Service	General Service	Total international	National professional officer	Local level	Int	Nat	Grand total
Mission	1	1	1	4	19	25	34	**85**	26	–	**111**	47	55	57	3	**273**
Backstopping	–	–	–	–	1	3	2	**6**	–	1	**7**	–	–	–	–	**7**
Total	**1**	**1**	**1**	**4**	**20**	**28**	**36**	**91**	**26**	**1**	**118**	**47**	**55**	**57**	**3**	**280**

33. There was no appropriation for 2016, hence the requirements are being met through commitment authorities approved to date or will be met through an additional commitment authority, submitted for the approval of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, for the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2261 (2016) and 2307 (2016). The expenditures relate to observers, civilian personnel and operational costs, including consultants; official travel; facilities and infrastructure; ground transportation; air transportation; communications; information technology; medical; and other supplies, services and equipment. Appropriation for the amount used against the commitment authorities is being sought in the context of the present report.

34. The estimated requirements for the United Nations Mission in Colombia for 2017 amount to $64,167,300 (net of staff assessment) and provide for costs relating to observers ($11,138,700) for 400 observers, civilian personnel costs ($22,028,300) for 280 positions (1 USG, 1 ASG, 1 D-2, 4 D-1, 20 P-5, 28 P-4, 36 P-3, 26 Field

Service, 1 General Service (Other level), 47 National Professional Officers, 55 Local level, and 60 United Nations Volunteers), as well as for operational costs ($31,000,300), comprising costs for consultants ($115,100), official travel ($1,608,400), facilities and infrastructure ($12,637,900) including maintenance services for 23 facilities for the Mechanism and the construction of more permanent structures, ground transportation ($2,862,000), including the rental of armoured vehicles for the Mechanism, air transportation ($5,169,400), communications ($6,138,900) including for the Mechanism camps, information technology ($2,041,800), medical ($222,000), and other supplies, services and equipment ($204,800).

35. In 2017, in relation to the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2261 (2016) and 2307 (2016), it is proposed that 280 positions be established in the United Nations Mission in Colombia. A total of 184 new positions are proposed for the substantive component, of which 7 would be based at United Nations headquarters as backstopping positions (1 P-5, 1 P-4 and 1 General Service (Other level) in the Department of Political Affairs and 2 P-4 and 2 P-3 in the Department of Field Support/Department of Peacekeeping Operations), and the remaining 177 positions would be based in the field. A total of 38 new positions are proposed for the security component, all based in the field, and 58 new positions are proposed for the mission support component, all of which would also be based in the field. Up to 400 observers would be deployed during 2017 to support the implementation of the mandate as part of the international component of the Mechanism.

Extrabudgetary resources

36. No extrabudgetary resources are projected for 2017 for the Mission.

II. Action requested of the General Assembly

37. **The General Assembly is requested to:**

(a) Approve the budget for the United Nations Mission in Colombia (Misión de las Naciones Unidas en Colombia) for 2017 amounting to $64,167,300, net of staff assessment;

(b) Appropriate, under the procedures provided for in paragraph 11 of annex I to resolution 41/213, an additional amount of $78,794,500 (net of staff assessment) under section 3, Political affairs, of the programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017, after taking into account the estimated expenditures for 2016, amounting to $14,627,200;

(c) Appropriate an amount of $3,084,800 under section 36, Staff assessment, to be offset by a corresponding amount under income section 1, Income from staff assessment, of the programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017.

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Agenda item 134
Programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017

Estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council

Thematic cluster III: United Nations offices, peacebuilding support offices, integrated offices and commissions

United Nations Mission in Colombia

Report of the Secretary-General

Corrigendum

Paragraph 35

For the existing text *substitute*

35. In 2017, in relation to the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2261 (2016) and 2307 (2016), it is proposed that 280 positions be established in the United Nations Mission in Colombia. A total of 184 new positions are proposed for the substantive component, of which 3 (1 P-5, 1 P-4 and 1 General Service (Other level)) would be based at United Nations Headquarters as backstopping positions in the Department of Political Affairs. Furthermore, four positions (2 P-4 and 2 P-3) are proposed for the Department of Field Support/Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The remaining 177 positions would be based in the field. A total of 38 new positions are proposed for the security component, all based in the field, and 58 new positions are proposed for the mission support component, all of which would also be based in the field. Up to 400 observers would be deployed during 2017 to support the implementation of the mandate as part of the international component of the Mechanism.

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Please recycle

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Programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017

Estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council

Thematic cluster II: special political missions

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report contains the proposed resource requirements for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, amounting to $3,278,800 (net of staff assessment) for the period from 1 November 2016 to 16 November 2017.

16-21780 (E) 131216

Please recycle

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism

($3,278,800)

Background, mandate and objective

1. On 7 August 2015, the Security Council adopted resolution 2235 (2015), condemning any use of toxic chemicals, such as chlorine, as a chemical weapon in the Syrian Arab Republic and expressing its determination to identify those responsible for these acts. In the same resolution, the Council established for a period of one year, with a possibility of future extension if it deemed it necessary, an Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism.

2. The Security Council further extended the Joint Investigative Mechanism, first with a technical roll-over from 22 September to 31 October 2016 to allow for the completion of a report, and then with the adoption on 31 October 2016 of resolution 2314 (2016) in which the Council decided to renew the mandate of the Joint Investigative Mechanism until 18 November 2016 and expressed its intention to consider a further extension before the expiration of that mandate. As a result, resolution 2319 (2016) was adopted on 17 November 2016, renewing the mandate for a further period of one year from the date of adoption of the resolution, with a possibility of a future extension and update if the Security Council deemed it necessary.

3. It is proposed that the Joint Investigative Mechanism continue to be managed by a Head with two deputies. Together, they would continue to form an independent, objective, impartial and professional leadership panel, consisting of an Assistant Secretary-General and two deputies at the D-2 level. The Head and deputies are proposed to be supported by 23 staff, as detailed in table 3. The staffing composition of the Mechanism is proposed to remain the same as for the period approved until 31 October 2016.

4. Pending approval by the General Assembly of the resource requirements for the activities of the Joint Investigative Mechanism for the period from 1 November 2016 to 16 November 2017, the requirements for the period from 1 November to 31 December 2016 are being funded under the authority granted to the Secretary-General under paragraph 1 (a) of General Assembly resolution 70/250 relating to unforeseen and extraordinary expenses for the biennium 2016-2017, for the cost of three positions. Those resource requirements for the period from 1 November to 31 December 2016 are included in the amount for which appropriation by the Assembly is requested in paragraph 19 (b) below.

5. The mandate of the Mechanism is to identify, to the greatest extent feasible, individuals, entities, groups or Governments who were perpetrators, organizers, sponsors or otherwise involved in the use of chemicals as weapons, including chlorine or any other toxic chemical, in the Syrian Arab Republic where the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) fact-finding mission determines or has determined that a specific incident in the Syrian Arab Republic involved or likely involved the use of chemicals as weapons, including chlorine or any other toxic chemical.

6. By its resolution 2319 (2016), the Security Council renewed the Mechanism for one year, with a possibility of a future extension, if it deems it necessary, with the same mandate. The Mechanism may undertake activities at locations where the use of toxic chemicals as a weapon is alleged to have occurred, including locations directly relevant to the Mechanism, such as hospitals and emergency response stations, any other locations within the Syrian Arab Republic, including territories not under its control, and neighbouring and other relevant States, as the Mechanism may consider necessary or appropriate. In its resolution 2319 (2016), the Security Council added new tasks to the work of the Mechanism, inter alia encouraging the Mechanism to consult, where relevant, appropriate United Nations counter-terrorism and non-proliferation bodies in order to exchange information on non-state actor perpetration, organization or sponsorship of or other involvement in the use of chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. The proposed budget also reflects the invitation by the Council in resolution 2319 (2016) to the Mechanism to engage relevant regional States, including in order to identify to the greatest extent feasible any individuals, entities or groups associated with Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da'esh) or the Nusrah Front who have been involved in the use of chemicals as weapons.

7. The Head of the Mechanism would continue to be supported by three components: a political office, based in New York and Damascus, which provides political analysis, legal advice and support with respect to media relations, information management, coordination and administration; an investigative office, based in The Hague, which collects information, both information available at OPCW and information obtained externally, and works to identify perpetrators through criminal investigation functions and analysis, including case management, counter-terrorism analysis, complex criminal analysis, forensics, military analysis, delivery system and ordnance analysis and other relevant information and corroboration analysis; and a planning and operations support office, based in New York, which provides support to the political and investigative components.

Cooperation with other entities

8. In fulfilling its tasks, the Mechanism works with United Nations departments, including the Office for Disarmament Affairs, the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Safety and Security, the Office of Legal Affairs and the Department of Field Support, as well as the United Nations country team in the Syrian Arab Republic, as necessary. In addition, it works closely with OPCW in terms of sharing information as needed for the investigations. It also coordinates at the working and senior levels with other organizations, including the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), among others, as appropriate. Furthermore, in resolution 2319 (2016) the Security Council encouraged the Mechanism to consult appropriate United Nations counter-terrorism and non-proliferation bodies to exchange information and encouraged the Mechanism to engage relevant regional States.

Performance information

9. In accordance with paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 2235 (2015), the Secretary-General submitted a letter to the President of the Council on 27 August 2015 (S/2015/669). The letter contained recommendations, including

elements of terms of reference, regarding the establishment and operation of the Mechanism. Security Council resolution 2319 (2016) continues that arrangement.

10. On 24 September 2015, the Head and deputies of the leadership panel began their work, following the appointment of the members by the Secretary-General. The Head of the Mechanism was approved by the Security Council. The process to recruit core staff was initiated on 25 September 2015. Staff were contracted for the duration of the original mandate contained in Council resolution 2235 (2015) ending in October 2016; as the extension of the mandate was decided by the Council only on 17 November 2016, staff contracts were terminated on 31 October 2016.

11. Given that appropriate support from Member States is required for the Mechanism to perform its role, a trust fund was established by the Secretary-General. On 25 September 2015, the Head of the Mechanism sent a letter seeking financial support from interested Member States, given that material and technical needs would be met from voluntary contributions. The trust fund became fully operative by January 2016 and is utilized for activities, deployments and specialized equipment as well as technical expertise needed in the pursuit of the operations of the Mechanism.

12. Between October and December 2015, the Mechanism set up its offices in New York, The Hague and Damascus.

Planning assumptions for 2017

13. As indicated in Security Council resolution 2319 (2016), the Mechanism continues to base its work on the letters dated 27 August and 9 September 2015 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2015/669 and S/2015/696), as well as on the terms of reference developed by the Mechanism, including with regard to its methods of work, information management, modalities for access, evidence and reporting.

14. The objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures of the Mechanism are set out below.

Table 1
Objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures

Objective of the Organization: To identify, to the greatest extent feasible, individuals, entities, groups or Governments who were perpetrators, organizers, sponsors or otherwise involved in the use of chemicals as weapons, including chlorine or any other toxic chemical, in the Syrian Arab Republic

Expected accomplishments of the Secretariat	*Indicators of achievement*	*Performance measures*	*2017*	*2*
(a) Effective application of methodological considerations for the implementation of the Mechanism's mandate; effective and timely reporting on the progress achieved by the Mechanism	(i) First report of the Secretary-General submitted within 90 days of the adoption of resolution 2319 (2016) and subsequent reports as appropriate thereafter, presentation of the reports to the Security Council and of information to the Executive Council of OPCW, and briefings, as appropriate, to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to	Target	3 reports (1 after 90 days and 2 subsequently)	3 reports (1 af 90 days a 2 subsequent
		Estimate	–	
		Actual		4 repo

	resolution 1540 (2004), the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, and other relevant counter-terrorism or non-proliferation bodies on relevant results of the work of the Mechanism			
	(ii) Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, in coordination with the Director-General of OPCW, and information provided to the OPCW Executive Council every 60 days thereafter on the progress made	Target	7 progress reports	5 progress reports
		Estimate	–	–
		Actual		5 progress reports
(b) Effective functioning of a confidential information security regime that will take into account the requirements deemed necessary for the storage and use of information and materials provided to the Mechanism by the OPCW fact-finding mission, as well as information provided to the Mechanism pursuant to paragraphs 7 and 8 of Security Council resolution 2235 (2015) and Council resolution 2319 (2016); and accountability through management and accessibility of authentic digital business records, archives and information	Processing and record-keeping of all information and evidence through the regime to be applied to all information obtained or generated by the Mechanism in the conduct of its work	Target	100 per cent	100 per cent
		Estimate	–	–
		Actual		100 per cent

Outputs

- Regular engagement and consultations with the Syrian Arab Republic and all parties in the Syrian Arab Republic on all issues relating to the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2235 (2015), 2314 (2016) and 2319 (2016)
- Regular engagement and consultation with relevant Member States and with partner organizations (OPCW, WHO and INTERPOL, among others), consultation with appropriate United Nations counter-terrorism and non-proliferation bodies in order to exchange information, and engagement with relevant regional States
- First report of the Mechanism within 90 days of the date of Security Council resolution 2319 (2016) and subsequent reports as appropriate thereafter
- Continued implementation of a record management system within a robust information security regime to be applied to all information obtained or generated by the Mechanism in the conduct of its work

External factors

15. The objective is expected to be achieved provided that security conditions are conducive to the implementation of the mandate, there is political will, support and engagement from the various stakeholders and there is continued strong support from the international community.

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 2
Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category	*1 January-31 October 2016*	*1 November 2016-16 November 2017*	*Variance*
Civilian personnel costs	3 628.9	2 712.2[a]	(916.7)
Operational costs	566.6	566.6	–
Subtotal	**4 195.50**	**3 278.8**	**(916.7)**

[a] Including an amount of $93,000 for the period from 1 November to 31 December 2016 funded under the authority granted to the Secretary-General under paragraph 1 (a) of General Assembly resolution 70/250 relating to unforeseen and extraordinary expenses.

Table 3
Positions

	Professional and higher categories									*General Service and related categories*			*National staff*			
	USG	*ASG*	*D-2*	*D-1*	*P-5*	*P-4*	*P-3*	*P-2*	***Subtotal***	*Field/ Security Service*	*General Service*	***Total international***	*National Professional Officers*	*Local level*	*United Nations Volunteers*	***Total***
Approved 2016	–	1	2	2	5	8	3	–	**21**	–	5	**21**	–	–	–	**26**
Proposed 2017	–	1	2	2	5	8	3	–	**21**	–	5	**21**	–	–	–	**26**
Change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

16. The estimated requirements for the Mechanism for the period from 1 November 2016 to 16 November 2017 amount to $3,278,800 (net of staff assessment) and provide for civilian personnel costs ($2,712,200) for 26 positions (1 Assistant Secretary-General, 2 D-2, 2 D-1, 5 P-5, 8 P-4, 3 P-3 and 5 General Service (Other level)), as well as office space, office automation equipment and furnishings for the offices in New York, The Hague and Damascus under facilities and infrastructure ($303,000), ground transportation ($27,800), communications ($89,800) and information technology ($138,400) and other supplies and services ($7,600).

17. The reduced requirements are mainly the result of the application of a vacancy factor of 30 per cent to the cost estimates for civilian personnel to 23 of the 26 proposed positions, from 1 January 2017 onwards (three positions are from 1 November 2016).

Extrabudgetary resources

18. Extrabudgetary resources are estimated at $5 million for the period from 1 January to 16 November 2017, which would be used to meet material and technical needs to support the implementation of the Mechanism's mandate.

19. **The General Assembly is requested:**

(a) **To approve the budget for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism for the period from 1 November 2016 to 16 November 2017 amounting to $3,278,800, net of staff assessment;**

(b) **To appropriate, under the procedures provided for in paragraph 11 of annex I to resolution 41/213, an additional amount of $3,278,800 (net of staff assessment) under section 34, Political affairs, of the programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017;**

(c) **To appropriate an amount of $482,900 under section 36, Staff assessment, to be offset by a corresponding amount under income section 1, Income from staff assessment, of the programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017.**